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Reservations About Retribution in Secular Society
Steven F. Huefner∗
INTRODUCTION
Martin Gardner’s thoughtful article Viewing the Criminal
1
Sanction Through Latter-day Saint Thought is an intriguing
exploration of the intersection of western secular law, on the one
hand, and concepts of eternal law contained in the theology and
practice of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, on the
other. It provides a fruitful opportunity for additional thought about
the relationship between the criminal sanction and moral
responsibility generally, as well as about the impact of Latter-day
Saint (LDS) theology on justificatory theories of punishment. I am
delighted to react to Gardner’s work and to offer my own
observations and reflections, albeit from a jurisprudential perspective
outside the immediate field of Criminal Law.
Primarily, my aim is to explain why I remain skeptical of
Gardner’s suggestion that Latter-day Saint theology justifies
2
3
imposing secular punishment on a retributive basis. While I am
sympathetic with Gardner’s sense that LDS theology and its
emphasis on personal agency, accountability, and eternal growth
strongly support the claim that moral wrongdoing deserves a
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State
University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the LDS Perspectives on Law
Conference, held at Brigham Young University on October 19, 2001. The author is grateful
for the contributions of Joshua Dressler, Dixie Huefner, Christian Johnson, Val Ricks, and
Gordon Smith. The views expressed in this Comment do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the
Brigham Young University Law Review.
1. Martin R. Gardner, Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day Saint
Thought, 2003 BYU L. REV. 861.
2. By secular punishment I refer to those punishments that an organized social
community inflicts on individuals that it adjudges to have committed a punishable offense. My
discussion herein is limited to western democratic societies, and focuses, like Gardner’s article,
on the legal system of the United States.
3. As Gardner indicates, justificatory theories of criminal punishment are typically
divided into two types: utilitarian (or consequentialist) and retributive. See Gardner, supra note
1, at 861 & n.3.
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sanction, I am unpersuaded that the theology sustains a retributive
justification for secular societies to impose this sanction or to punish
wrongdoing. Where Gardner suggests that secular or criminal
5
“punishment is required in order that justice be done,” I would
suggest that such punishments instead merely have the potential to
facilitate the achievement of ultimate justice.
My response will proceed in two parts. Part I will discuss what I
see as some general theoretical obstacles to justifying secular
retribution upon ideas in LDS theology. In particular, I will explain
that largely because of society’s inherent difficulties in determining
and meting out “just deserts,” I remain skeptical that secular
retribution is required to do justice. While these difficulties provide
arguments for rejecting retributivism independent of theology, I
believe they resonate with principles of LDS doctrine and resulting
ideas of ultimate or eternal justice.
Part II will discuss specific aspects of LDS theology that seem to
my mind to count against any requirement for secular retribution.
Principal among these is the doctrine of the atonement of Christ, as
a result of which each individual need not suffer the full
consequences of personal wrongdoing. This Part will also respond to
many of Gardner’s particular arguments from LDS scripture and
statements of church leaders, arguing that, if anything, these same
sources more strongly support a utilitarian justification for secular
punishment.
I. GENERAL THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RETRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
To explain my lingering skepticism that LDS theology sustains a
retributive justification for secular societies to impose criminal
punishment, I will first describe what I understand “retribution” to
mean. Next, I will briefly argue that retribution is both too broad
and too narrow a justification for secular punishment. As a specific
example, I then will discuss Gardner’s approach to the death penalty,
explaining why his insights there pose broader problems for what I
take to be his claim concerning the necessity of secular retribution.

4. See id. at 871–74, 877–81; see also Articles of Faith 2 (Pearl of Great Price) (“We
believe that men will be punished for their own sins, and not for Adam’s transgression.”).
5. Gardner, supra note 1, at 861.
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A. The Idea of Retribution from an LDS Perspective

At the outset, it is important to clarify how I interpret Gardner
to use the term “retribution.” In common parlance, we often hear
6
the word retribution used to include revenge or “getting even.” In
contrast, Gardner appropriately has narrowed the idea of retribution
to exclude revenge and has defined it instead simply as the idea of
7
“just deserts,” or as a “demand of justice” that must be met. In
other words, one who commits a wrong therefore deserves to be
punished.
But why must this demand be met? Here, retribution seems to
connote a cosmic or eternal “squaring of accounts,” or moral
8
balancing. Gardner identifies two distinctive aspects of this
6. For instance, a TIME magazine essay on September 12, 2001, titled “The Case for
Rage and Retribution,” argued for “ruthless indignation,” “focused brutality,” and “a
wholesome and intelligent enmity” in response to the previous day’s terrorist attacks on
American soil. Lance Marrow, The Case for Rage and Retribution, TIME, Sept. 12, 2001, at
48, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,174641,00.html.
7. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 862. Gardner’s articulation of a “just deserts”
justification of punishment argues that “punishment is justified, indeed required, simply
because it is just” and that punishing wrongdoers therefore is “intrinsically good, independent
of any beneficial consequences.” Id. In limiting his conception of retribution to this extent,
Gardner is employing a classic formulation. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64
PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955) (describing the retributive view as justifying punishment because
“[i]t is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer . . . . The state of affairs
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does
not; and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.”); GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416–17 (1978) (“Retribution simply means that
punishment is justified by virtue of its relationship to the offense that has been committed.”);
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983) (describing
the retributivist justification of punishment as the philosophy that “someone who has violated
the rights of others should be penalized, and punishment restores the moral order that has
been breached by the original wrongful act”); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 88 (1997)
(“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient
reason to punish him or her . . . .”). More particularly, Gardner appears to be employing what
Jeffrie Murphy has called “character retributivism.” Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the
Retributive Emotions, and the “Clumsy Moral Philosophy” of Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW 149, 153 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
8. Gardner’s formulation of retributive theory contains no explicit reliance on any
notion of eternal, cosmic, or universal justice. His approach is consistent with much
contemporary retributivist thinking, which either “appeal[s] to little more than intuition,” Jean
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1659, 1659 (1992), or else strives to develop an argument that punishment effectuates
the wrongdoer’s reconciliation with society (or perhaps with the victim), rather than with the
universe or God, see, e.g., id. at 1685–98. However, when developed in this latter way, the
values of retributivist punishment might also be conceptualized in utilitarian terms, including,
for example, punishment’s salutary effects of helping to build order and stability within a
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reconciliation, one focused on making whole the larger community,
the other focused on making whole the wrongdoer. First, he argues
that punishment may serve primarily to exact from an offender “the
9
amount of suffering deemed proper to pay the ‘debt’ owed society.”
But he also describes the importance to the wrongdoer of this
reconciliation, aligning himself with others who speak of a
10
wrongdoer having a “right” to be punished. Thus, through
punishment, a demand is satisfied and a reconciliation is achieved,
for the benefit of both the wrongdoer and the cosmos itself.
Something is not right with the universe until a wrongdoer makes
11
recompense, and so in some fashion pays a debt back, thereby
bringing the wrongdoer, and in turn the universe, closer to God. In
other words, retribution amounts to atonement and expiation.
This view of retribution understandably “resonates” with
12
Gardner, as well as with other LDS adherents, both out of faith in
13
principles of atonement and because of the centrality to LDS
theology of the concept of individual eternal progress. This theology
certainly lends support to the idea that punishment is a “right” that
each of us possesses in connection with our own wrongdoing,

temporal community, improving the human feelings and relationships in that community, and
satisfying the community’s need to express its displeasure about bad conduct. See Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). I have
therefore chosen to link retributivism expressly to notions of metaphysical or eternal justice and
reconciliation—a choice that also seems appropriate given Gardner’s, and this conference’s,
enterprise of relating theories of law to LDS thought and theology. Otherwise, the retributivist
claim that wrongdoers should be punished simply because they “deserve” to be would become,
in the words of Richard Wasserstrom, “not an argument but merely an assertion.” Richard
Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 328,
337 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
9. Gardner, supra note 1, at 865.
10. Id. at 864–68.
11. As Rawls expressed it, “[t]he state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment
is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not . . . .” Rawls, supra note 7, at 5.
Or, in one of Kant’s formulations quoted by Gardner, “[i]f legal justice perishes, then it is no
longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on this earth.” Gardner, supra note 1, at 863
(quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Lodd
trans., 1965)). I note, however, that this view seems potentially inconsistent with certain
elements of LDS theology, in which mortal life can have value even under tyrannical
governments or in a “lawless” society.
12. Gardner, supra note 1, at 870.
13. Most importantly, at the core of LDS doctrine is faith in the atonement of Jesus
Christ. I briefly discuss the relationship between secular punishment and the atonement of
Christ in Part II.C, infra.
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allowing us to experience the consequences of our actions. Personal
accountability, free will, and the related notion of eternal growth and
progression implicitly include not only an openness to but also a
15
need for true chastening.
I concede that from this perspective I too share some (possibly
16
paternalistic ) temptation towards retribution, and towards
structuring secular society so as to enhance wrongdoers’ access to
their “rights” to punishment. I also note that, from a theological or
metaphysical standpoint, this defense of and inclination towards
retribution may itself ultimately rely upon a utilitarian or
consequentialist idea, albeit not one limited to the consequences
flowing to secular society in mortality. In particular, what does
Gardner really mean when he says that retribution is “intrinsically
17
good”? Specifically from the standpoint of LDS theology, it seems
that secular retribution might seem intrinsically good or attractive to
us precisely because of the positive eternal results that it brings about
and its therefore beneficial contributions to a divine system of justice
predicated on individual agency and accountability. Nevertheless, I
am skeptical that even these eternal justifications can be adequately
translated to a retributive defense of a secular system of punishment,
as I next explain.
B. Secular Retribution’s Over- and Under-Inclusiveness
Assuming that retribution embodies the idea that individuals
both deserve and have a right to be punished for their wrongdoing,
then I believe that Gardner’s account of it as a justification for
secular, rather than eternal, punishment is both too broad and too
narrow. It is too broad, first, because despite setting the burden of
proof for criminal sanctions at the very high level of “beyond a
14. See Gardner’s overview of these ideas and related references, supra note 1, at 877–81
and accompanying notes.
15. Cf. STERLING M. MCMURRIN, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
MORMON RELIGION 12–13 (1965) (describing Mormon conception of eternal progress as
predicated on human freedom); Hebrews 12:6, 12:11 (“For whom the Lord loveth he
chasteneth . . . . [Chastening] yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness . . . .”).
16. Paternalism is typically associated more with utilitarian theories of punishment than
with retributive ones, in that a common purpose of utilitarian punishment is to reform or
improve the criminal. On the other hand, forcing criminals to “enjoy” their rights to
punishment, and thereby to become reconciled, strikes me as potentially just as paternalistic,
and it is from this perspective that I admit to feeling an urge to make everyone whole.
17. Gardner, supra note 1, at 862.
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reasonable doubt,” we as a secular society still do—and inevitably
will—make mistakes and impose punishments on those who are
19
wholly undeserving. At the same time, this retributive justification
of secular punishment also is too narrow because we simply do not
provide or even try to provide this “right” to be punished to all who
deserve or merit it. On the contrary, in a variety of ways we have
deliberately chosen not to attempt to do so, for instance by adopting
20
21
the exclusionary rule and by prohibiting double jeopardy, in
addition to using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof.
These and related problems strike me as more than minor details
if secular retribution indeed is necessary for justice to be done. For
instance, Gardner explains that Herbert Morris would limit his
retributive “right” to be punished to a legal system with certain
22
safeguards, including requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
23
But why should this particular procedural protection be required?
Of course it reduces those instances in which society mistakenly
punishes the innocent; yet it also dramatically increases those
instances in which society fails to punish the guilty, and thereby
denies a huge number of wrongdoers their rights to retributive
punishment.

18. This decision reflects society’s choice to favor other secular values—principally the
protection of the innocent from the power of the state—over the satisfaction of the demands
of retributive justice. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1406–09 (1991) (describing traditional criminal
processes as using “innocence-weighted approach,” rather than either “guilt-weighted” or
neutral alternatives); see also infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
19. See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1632–
33 (1992). The innocence projects that have sprung to life in many states in the last several
years, following several high-profile capital cases in which DNA testing has subsequently
proven the innocence of a wrongly convicted defendant, are but one recent manifestation that,
even with our beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, we still punish the innocent.
20. To deter law enforcement officers from violating rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use in a criminal trial of illegally obtained
evidence. For a summary of the exclusionary rule, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 377–422 (3d ed. 2002).
21. “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. Gardner, supra note 1, at 864 n.10.
23. It is not enough to say that society has chosen to protect the innocent in this way.
See supra note 18. Instead, the question is, how has society made this choice, or why has
society valued innocence protection above facilitating access to our rights to retributive
punishment?
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Gardner seems to acknowledge this imperfect correlation
between deserved and imposed punishments, but suggests that doing
24
“rough justice” will be sufficient. Yet as long as “rough justice” is
adequate for a retributive theory of punishment, one could imagine a
system that performed equally well or better—in other words,
provided “just deserts” with an equal or lesser rate of error—but
which convicted, for instance, based on a preponderance standard,
rather than on a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Indeed, if
retribution at the hands of the state is morally necessary for all
wrongdoers, why not punish anyone who even arguably may have
25
committed a wrong? Might we not thereby be doing them a favor?
26
Similarly, what should we think of the exclusionary rule (and its
typically utilitarian justifications) given its potential effect of denying
a wrongdoer’s right to punishment and a victim’s right to
vindication through punishment of the guilty? Or, to take another
problem, should we favor an inquisitorial, rather than adversarial,
legal system, if we aim primarily to provide wrongdoers with their
27
punishment rights? Of course, these issues may simply reflect a
reality that society today does not attempt to justify secular
punishment primarily on a retributive basis, not that it could not or
should not do so as a normative matter. But these questions also may
suggest a difficulty in claiming that secular punishment is required to
accomplish a necessary reconciliation or expiation between
wrongdoers and God or the universe, for society certainly is not
now, and is not likely ever to be, providing this right uniformly to
wrongdoers.

24. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 887–89.
25. In other words, why could not a “rough justice” system for meting out retributive
punishments be structured equally well as over-inclusive, or “guilt-weighted,” rather than
under-inclusive, or “innocence-weighted,” to borrow Tom Stacy’s lexicon? Stacy has argued
that our criminal processes would produce the fewest errors, and thus the most accurate
distribution of retributive rights, were it neither innocence-weighted nor guilt-weighted, but
instead neutral. See Stacy, supra note 18, at 1408. This argument seems to presume that the
principle of retribution is zero sum, however, when such a characteristic might not necessarily
be required. That is, although gratuitous suffering might be objectionable for a variety of
reasons, it is not clear that it would necessarily undermine retributivist theory.
26. See supra note 20.
27. For an argument that an inquisitorial system better determines “absolute” truth,
while the adversary system, in pursuit of additional values, settles for a “pragmatic” truth,
which may more easily result in letting wrongdoers avoid criminal responsibility, see Matthew
T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence
in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 187–89 (2002).
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Furthermore, even where society does succeed in identifying the
truly culpable, it simply cannot determine what would be, for
purposes of some metaphysical or eternal account-squaring, the
appropriate or “deserved” quality and quantity of secular
28
punishment.
Rather, in almost every case, the particular
punishment that society chooses to impose is sure to be either too
29
harsh or too lenient to reconcile the cosmic balance sheet properly.
To the extent that we again would respond by accepting secularly
30
imposed punishments as providing only “rough justice,” or as the
first approximations of some ultimate eternal “just deserts,” it seems
31
that we would need some additional justificatory theory. Indeed, in
contrast to the idea of a “just desert,” what would seem to underlie
this much cruder secular version of retribution is what we might call
the idea of an “almost-just desert,” an idea with something of an
oxymoronic quality.
These concerns about retributivism are not meant to suggest that
utilitarian justifications alone are sufficient for criminal sanctions, or
that society can ignore issues of culpability in meting out
punishment. Otherwise, society might deliberately punish individuals
who in fact are morally blameless simply to frighten others into

28. That, of course, is a judgment for the eternities, and one that seems intimately
connected to the idea of the atonement. See infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. It is
not a judgment for which our mortal societies and institutions are well-suited. Accordingly,
Hart called this “the most perplexing feature” of a retributive justification of punishment.
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 233 (1968); see also Dolinko, supra note
19, at 1635–42 (discussing the difficulty of determining truly “deserved” punishment, and
dismissing retributivist efforts to impose merely “proportional” punishment, instead, as both
inadequate and corroborative of underlying flaw); Murphy, supra note 7, at 157–59 (arguing
that because we lack true understanding of the extent to which wrongdoers deserve
punishment, “we act recklessly in inflicting misery on people as the suffering they deserve for
their inner wickedness”).
29. Sentencing guidelines, death penalty qualification factors, and the like are all efforts
to tailor punishments to fit the crime. Likewise, diminished capacity and other defenses operate
in theory to spare penalizing the truly “undeserving.” But ultimately these and other measures
are only crude and imperfect tools of matching punishments with culpability. See supra note
28.
30. Gardner, supra note 1, at 888–89.
31. This problem seems inherent in retributivism even if we adopt a version, such as that
which Gardner attributes to Stephen Morse, see id. at 884, that purports only to require a
proportionally “deserved” punishment, rather than a punishment absolutely and invariably
fixed as the amount deserved for a specific wrongdoing. Even here, our inability to determine
true moral culpability, given our inability to judge the hearts and minds of wrongdoers,
renders us unable adequately to determine desert.

980

HUE-FIN

973]

9/30/2003 4:33 PM

Reservations About Retribution in Secular Society
32

compliance with authority. An adequate justification of secular
punishment still requires a meaningful if imperfect effort to establish
33
“blameworthiness.” But even from an LDS perspective of the
eternal importance of personal accountability, the principle of
blameworthiness also does not alone justify secular punishment,
absent the practical benefits flowing to society from the criminal
34
justice system and its sanctioning of wrongdoing.
C. The Death Penalty: Only One Example of
the Problem of “Rough Justice”
The preceding skepticism about the claim that LDS theology
supports a retributive justification for secular punishment derives
partly from the same reasons that Gardner identifies in the section of
his article articulating opposition to the death penalty. As he explains
it, “[m]oral culpability is . . . a subjective state” that for its
determination requires “the ability to ‘search people’s minds,’” a

32. This is a classic critique of pure utilitarian justifications of punishment. See, e.g., id. at
866 n.15 (quoting a passage from C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES
JUDICATAE 224, 227–28 (1953)). Such a system of course would be fraught with the danger
of being exposed as a sham, in which individual conduct had no correlation with punishment
or consequence, and hence would lose all its utilitarian value. It is also objectionable on
broader grounds as well. See infra note 33.
33. Punishment without culpability would strike us all as a gross injustice, whether out
of its inconsistency with ideas of retributive justice, out of its inconsistency with the aims of
utilitarian justice, or, even more generally, out of a sense that any enlightened society must
protect individual rights and freedoms from arbitrary exercises of state power. See, e.g.,
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 65–69 (1968); HART, supra
note 28, at 10–13; KANT, supra note 11, at 100 (as quoted in Gardner, supra note 1, at 863 &
n.6). The idea that society should punish only the deserving does not necessarily imply that the
sole or even primary justification for secular punishment should be to mete out “just deserts.”
Rather, many theorists now follow Hart in distinguishing between retribution in the
distribution of punishment and retribution in the justification for punishment. See, e.g., HART,
supra note 28, at 9; 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 160 (1988); see also Gardner, supra note 1, at 862 n.5, 868 n.21
(noting that some retributive theories other than the ones on which his article focuses may
claim only that retribution is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for punishment). In
this regard, I am employing what some have variously called a “mixed theory” or a theory of
“negative” retribution, while Gardner employs a version of “pure” or “positive retribution,” in
which blameworthiness alone justifies punishment. See Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals:
How Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451–53 (1990).
34. Furthermore, these benefits in theory could include satisfying the need for
retribution, or even for vengeance, felt by some members of society. See, e.g., Robinson &
Darley, supra note 8, at 454 (“[C]riminal law based on the community’s perceptions of just
desert is, from a utilitarian perspective, the more effective strategy for reducing crime.”).
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process “unattainable in earthly tribunals.” When we implement a
system of capital punishment, he continues, we “risk the injustice of
executing those . . . not sufficiently culpable,” as well as those who
36
are “totally innocent.” Because retributivism, when properly
37
conceived, “‘allows life to be taken only when death is deserved,’”
society lacks the ability to ensure that the death penalty is imposed
with an adequate retributive justification.
Why don’t these same concerns apply to any secular punishment?
That death is a punishment different in kind does not seem to be an
adequate response to these core issues about the underlying
justification of any punishment at all. Doesn’t retributivism require
that, for its proper imposition, any punishment be deserved? Gardner
acknowledges that this question merits extensive discussion, but
suggests that being content with “rough justice” will ultimately
38
provide a sufficient basis for a distinction.
Although I am content to tolerate (or even embrace) the idea of
“rough justice” in our secular social order, I do so for utilitarian
39
reasons.
But I find it difficult to rely on this practical
accommodation as a basis for a retributive theory of secular
punishment. Doesn’t a properly conceived theory of retributivism
require us to eschew undeserved punishments generally? If so, then
on what basis do we allow our uncertainty regarding one’s ultimate
desert to dissuade us only from imposing one particular kind of
punishment, but not another? Certainly as a kind of punishment
death may be different, but not in a way that eliminates the
fundamental problem of imposing undeserved punishment in the
name of achieving “just deserts.” Rough justice may be—in fact
40
certainly is—“the best our [secular] legal system can ever achieve,”

35. Gardner, supra note 1, at 884 (quoting Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence:
An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177,
1183 (1981)).
36. Id. at 885.
37. Id. at 886 (quoting Lempert, supra note 35, at 1183).
38. See id. at 887–89.
39. Namely, with culpability still a predicate, see supra notes 32–34 and accompanying
text, but with processes heavily weighted towards innocence protection, see supra note 18, we
do our best to determine who has committed a crime and then impose punishment because of
the resulting benefits. And while we yet should want our punishments to be proportional to
the crime, see infra note 62, we need not attempt the impossible task of discerning precisely
what kind or amount of punishment will fully reconcile the wrongdoing.
40. Gardner, supra note 1, at 888.
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but to me this suggests that we need a justificatory theory for rough
justice other than retribution, with its eternal, cosmic, universal
41
weight and implications. Otherwise, the idea of “rough retributive
justice” will inherently give rise to precisely the types of problems of
both over- and under-inclusiveness described in Part I.B above.
II. LDS THEOLOGY AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SECULAR
PUNISHMENT
The preceding more general reflections now bring me to a few
observations about the justification of secular punishment drawn
from specific details of LDS theology. First, I will raise a question
about the retributive efficacy, from an eternal standpoint, of secularly
coerced punishments. Second, I will express a thought about proxy
punishments. In turn, this will lead into a brief but essential
discussion of the atonement of Christ as a basis for skepticism about
the necessity of secular retribution. Finally, I will respond to the
particular scriptural and historical references in Gardner’s article.
A. Secular Retribution from an Eternal Perspective
The LDS doctrine of eternal progression gives rise to a demand
that we both learn from and make amends for our mistakes. This
demand of justice undeniably has a retributivist flavor. But the
doctrine of eternal progression does not suggest to me that we
should depend upon, or even expect, secular society to be the
moving cause for the imposition of retributive justice. On the
contrary, it seems to me that individual wrongdoers are expected to
seek to vindicate their “rights” to punishment voluntarily.
In the eternal scheme, one need not be found guilty by a secular
court in order to be either obligated or able to pay retribution. In
part, this is because of a lack of congruence between spiritual sin and
crime. Obviously it also is because of the imperfect ability of courts
42
to convict actual wrongdoers. And it is also because, in some

41. For extensive arguments that retributive justifications fail on their own terms, see
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U.
L. REV. 843 (2002), and Dolinko, supra note 19.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 18–27.
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circumstances, a contrite wrongdoer may pay retribution without the
43
involvement of secular authority.
Of course, a wrongdoer can confess and thereby eliminate the
possibility that our secular courts will fail to convict. Indeed,
ecclesiastical confession seems clearly the preferred predicate for
retribution in LDS theology: wrongdoing leads first to remorse,
followed by confession to God, to wronged individuals, and, where
44
appropriate, to church authorities. In addition, the wrongdoer then
is expected both to forsake the misconduct and to make restitution
45
where possible, including accepting whatever secular punishment
society imposes. This is all part of the process by which individuals
“pay the price” for their errors, and take responsibility on an
46
ongoing basis for “participat[ing] in their own salvation.”
But where confession, and, in turn, true remorse or contrition,
47
are lacking, how “intrinsically good” can coerced retribution be?
Does true expiation for individual wrongdoing need to be selfinitiated, or at least voluntary, rather than forced? Perhaps forced
expiation can occasionally cause the self-reflection that leads to
remorse and, ultimately, to strengthened character and eternal
48
growth, but this is by no means its natural or inevitable result.
From the standpoint of LDS theology, and the preeminent role
therein of individual agency and accountability, why should secular
society force punishments on those who place no value on their own
rights to receive punishment? Here, utilitarian justifications certainly
43. It is not clear that LDS theology in all instances requires a person who commits a
minor but chargeable crime—for instance, shoplifting or criminal trespass—to submit to
secular authority, provided the wrongdoer has made full restitution and genuinely repented.
44. For a contemporary introduction to church doctrine concerning repentance, see
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, GOSPEL PRINCIPLES 122–27 (1992)
[hereinafter GOSPEL PRINCIPLES]. Of course, ecclesiastical confession is distinct from secular
confession; and while in many instances the first may lead to the second, this seems by no
means always necessary, as suggested above. See supra note 43.
45. See id. at 124–25.
46. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 880.
47. Here, I am referring to my previously expressed sense that from an LDS perspective
principles of retributive punishment may seem inherently good because of their beneficial
impact on a wrongdoer’s eternal development. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. Nor does forced expiation have a happy history. Indeed, in furtherance of just such
expiation, and in seeking the “intrinsic goodness” of doing justice, many societies and cultures
have engaged, for instance, in burnings at the stake or have compelled certain conduct or even
have compelled belief. Within the Christian tradition, some of the most obvious of these events
would include the Spanish Inquisition and the prosecution of Galileo Galilei for the heresy of
subscribing to the Copernican view of the solar system.
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spring to mind, including some related to the theology of eternal
progression and individual agency. For instance, deterrent effects of
secular punishment may keep individuals from wrongdoing until
their own character has developed to the point of independently
causing them to avoid it. Or, secular punishment may serve to
incapacitate one whose actions otherwise would seriously impinge on
49
the freedom of others. But when wrongdoers are not ready to be
reconciled, it is much less clear that a retributive theory of secular
punishment will achieve any eternal aspirations we may have for it.
B. Proxy Punishment
From an LDS perspective, a “rights” theory of punishment
seems especially apt when a wrongdoer voluntarily seeks to vindicate
these rights as part of an ongoing self-improvement process. What,
then, of one whose remorse for wrongdoing and whose voluntary
desire to be reconciled come too late for retribution through secular
punishment? This might happen because of a statute of limitations
50
problem, but consider the more interesting case of one whose
remorse occurs after death. Is there still eternal progress for the
secularly unpunished, and therefore unretributed?
LDS theology certainly holds out the hope that, through the
performance of vicarious ordinances of salvation, some who repent
after this life may still experience many of the blessings of having
51
lived a penitent life in mortality. Accordingly, if we believe that
49. In addition, some have argued that punishments may have instructive moral value
even for the unrepentant wrongdoer. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984) (arguing that the primary purpose of
punishment is to teach wrongdoers moral bases for choosing not to commit offenses).
50. This is but another example of the way in which secular retribution may be too
narrow. See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text.
51. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 255–57; 1 Peter 4:6; 1 Corinthians
15:29. The LDS doctrine of baptism for the dead provides for the performance by proxy of the
ordinance of baptism on behalf of those who would have embraced the gospel during their
mortal life had they had the opportunity to do so. Although it also has elements of a “second
chance” for those who rejected the gospel in mortality or who willfully refused the opportunity
to repent, such individuals may not fully benefit from vicarious baptism. Nonetheless,
consistent with the broadest application of the doctrine, there may be many individuals who
did not repent in this life only because of their lack of knowledge concerning gospel teachings.
See Doctrine & Covenants 138:31–35. Moreover, the gospel teaches that those who embrace
its teachings in this life thereby become obligated to continually evaluate their conduct and
repent as necessary. Presumably, some beneficiaries of the practice of baptism for the dead
could also have benefited from this ongoing post-baptism repentance process, had they
embraced the gospel in mortality. It is in this light that I reflect here on the hypothetical
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secular punishment is required in order that justice be done, then
just as LDS theology has room for vicarious baptisms for the dead, it
seems that it might also have room for the idea of vicarious
punishments “for the dead.” That the doctrine of baptism for the
dead in fact does not include any corollary principle of proxy
punishment provides a simple demonstration that in LDS theology
whatever punishment is required need not come at the hands of
secular authorities in mortality. Rather, LDS theology has no
principle of “punishments for the dead” per se because at the very
heart of LDS theology is the doctrine of the atonement.
C. The Atonement
Central to my thinking about the implications of LDS theology
on the justification of secular punishment is the doctrine of Christ’s
atonement. The atonement amounts to a vicarious punishment on
behalf of every one of us, if we avail ourselves, for all of our
52
wrongdoing. Through the atonement, the retribution that is
required of each of us for our individual wrongdoing is essentially
53
spiritual, leading to a reconciliation with God that then will permit
the atonement to operate in our lives to accomplish whatever further
cosmic balancing eternal justice requires for our individual
wrongdoing.
Admittedly, LDS theology suggests that “[e]very man must
answer for his own sins” and that “salvation can come only through

possibility of vicarious punishments as well, on behalf of those whose repentance for mortal
wrongdoing does not occur until after their stay in mortality has concluded.
52. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 73–78. As a result of the atonement, the
idea of “punishment for the dead” becomes wholly superfluous, because a baptism for the dead
then cleanses the beneficiary’s slate of all mortal wrongdoing.
53. See, e.g., 2 Corinthians 7:9–11 (describing the notion of “godly sorrow,” which
“worketh repentance to salvation”). Suggestive of this spiritual retribution or suffering is
Michael Moore’s description, recounted by Gardner, of the “extreme culpability” and
“sickness unto death” one ought to feel at committing a horrible crime. See Gardner, supra
note 1, at 868–69 (quoting Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 80–81 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999)). However, this passage
also suggests to me the possibility that this spiritual suffering may itself be not only necessary
but also sufficient for the demands of eternal justice, regardless of whether society ever satisfies
the guilty person’s felt need that society impose an “extraordinarily severe punishment.” Id. at
869 (quoting Moore, supra, at 82). For a critique of Moore’s argument from hypothesized
guilt, see Murphy, supra note 7.
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obedience to law” (in contrast to theologies in which salvation
comes through faith alone). Yet the personal accountability inherent
in this formulation does not necessarily provide a basis for
concluding that secular punishments should be justified retributively.
Rather, consistent with this formulation, individuals can be forgiven
for their wrongdoing through the process of repentance, thereby
achieving that union of justice and mercy described by C.S. Lewis
55
and others. While the repentance process may include elements of
both spiritual and temporal or physical suffering for the wrongdoing,
it is not clear that some temporal or secular punishment is always a
necessary component of the repentance process by which a person
56
“answers” for sin and partakes of the atonement.
Therefore, it seems to me a mistake to expect that our system of
secular justice should impose, even as a matter of “rough justice,” a
punishment that is in essence commensurate with our wrongdoing.
From the standpoint of LDS theology, such an effort seems
inherently flawed. The atonement teaches us that we cannot and
need not literally repay in full the debts that we incur for our
mistakes, and that we instead may answer for our misdeeds in other
ways. We therefore may hope for secular punishments that are in fact
proportionate to our wrongdoing, but only as a facilitative
component of our eternal growth, rather than as a necessary
57
component of eternal retribution. In particular, bearing even a
token measure of blame for our misconduct may have an instructive
value to us, helping us to internalize the consequences of our
58
choices. But one who feels remorse and seeks expiation may not
necessarily need a secular punishment in order that justice be done.

54. MCMURRIN, supra note 15, at 90; see also Articles of Faith 2 (Pearl of Great Price)
(“We believe that men will be punished for their own sins, and not for Adam’s transgression.”).
55. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 867 (quoting C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of
Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 229–30 (1953); id. at 875–76 (quoting Neal A. Maxwell,
Jesus, the Perfect Mentor, ENSIGN, Feb. 2001, at 8, 12).
56. For additional discussions of the doctrine of the atonement in LDS theology, see
MCMURRIN, supra note 15, at 82–90; GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, at 71–78.
57. Consistent with this view that secular punishments are not required to fulfill the
demands of eternal justice is the church’s repudiation of the doctrine of “blood atonement,”
which Gardner has previously described. See Martin R. Gardner, Mormonism and Capital
Punishment: A Doctrinal Perspective, Past and Present, DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT,
Spring 1979, at 9, 16–22.
58. Cf. Hampton, supra note 49 (arguing that the primary purpose of punishment is to
teach the wrongdoers moral bases for choosing not to commit offenses).
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D. Utilitarian Aspects of Specific LDS Statements
Concerning Punishment
Partly from the preceding thoughts, I read pertinent LDS
scriptural references concerning punishment, as well as particular
statements of church authorities on the subject, to support a
utilitarian theory of punishment at least as much as, if not more than,
they support retributive theory. These statements include the same
scriptural passages that Gardner analyzes, and the same statements he
cites from contemporary church authorities and early church
President Brigham Young. In addition, the prophet Joseph Smith
expressed a remarkably clear utilitarian view of secular punishment.
For instance, the expression in section 134 of the Doctrine &
59
Covenants that wrongdoers “should be punished according to their
60
criminality and their tendency to evil among men,” which Gardner
61
interprets as expressing the idea of “just deserts,” also seems
entirely consistent with utilitarian theories of deterrence,
rehabilitation, and perhaps incapacitation as well. Furthermore, to
the extent that this passage implies the idea that punishments should
be proportional, this characteristic is not unique to retributive
62
justifications.

59. The Doctrine & Covenants is a canon of LDS scripture consisting primarily of
revelations received by Joseph Smith between 1823 and 1843, along with several other central
statements of doctrine. Section 134 is “[a] declaration of belief regarding governments and
laws in general, adopted by unanimous vote at a general assembly of the church held at
Kirtland, Ohio, August 17, 1835.” Doctrine & Covenants 134.
60. Id. at 134:8.
61. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 871.
62. Proportionality is widely desired on many theories of punishment. For instance,
Bentham made clear that proportionality was important to his utilitarian theory of punishment.
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 165–74 (Oxford 1996). Furthermore, although Justice Scalia is known for
having opined in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991), that “[p]roportionality is
inherently a retributive concept,” other aspects of his opinion in that case confirm that
retribution has no monopoly on the ideal of proportionality. In particular, Justice Scalia also
invoked what he called “[t]he New Hampshire proportionality provision, by far the most
detailed” of numerous proportionality provisions found in early state constitutions, yet a
provision that expressly justified punishment on utilitarian rather than retributivist grounds:
“All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence. No wise
legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like,
which they do to those of murder and treason; where the same undistinguishing
severity is exerted against all offences; the people are led to forget the real distinction
in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little
compunction as they do those of the lightest dye: For the same reason a multitude
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In particular, I adverted earlier to the idea that although society
could employ utilitarian systems of punishment without the
predicate of any true blameworthiness, such a system would be a
63
house of cards. Once ordinary citizens learned that the victims of
society’s punishment were not necessarily culpable, the utilitarian
values derived from the punishment would rapidly evaporate.
Utilitarian justifications of deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation also should all depend on punishing the actual
64
wrongdoer, within the limits of “rough justice.” Thus, section
134’s inclusion of an idea of blameworthiness in no way precludes it
from serving primarily as a premise for utilitarian justifications of
65
secular punishment.
Likewise, section 42 of the Doctrine & Covenants, which appears
to require church members, as a matter of religious obligation, to
subject their colleagues to civil punishment, seems to me at least as
amenable to a utilitarian interpretation as to the retributivist
interpretation that Gardner ascribes to it. In particular, members of
the community of Saints may have an obligation to see offenders
among them punished according to secular law not to ensure that
66
wrongdoers receive their “just deserts,” but rather purely as a
secular ordering principle. In fact, at the time of section 42, church
members may have felt this obligation particularly acutely, given that
the church’s relationship to greater American society was quite

of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all punishments
being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind.”
Id. at 978 n.8 (emphasis added) (quoting N.H. CONST. art. XVIII, pt. 1).
63. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
64. As previously discussed, see supra note 33, this approach is sometimes identified as a
“mixed” approach, as “distributive retribution,” or as “negative retribution.”
65. Furthermore, as Gardner acknowledges, see Gardner, supra note 1, at 871 n.29, 872
n.30, section 134 is replete with other language, not only elsewhere in verse 8 but also in
verses 1 and 6, that clearly “addresses the virtues of the legal order in general utilitarian terms.”
Id. at 872 n.30. Nor would verse 8 become “redundant,” id. at 871 n.29, if we also
interpreted this verse primarily in utilitarian terms as well, for it then would be extending to
the specific category of the criminal law verse 1’s much more general statement about the
utilitarian purpose of all secular law to advance “the good and safety of society,” Doctrine &
Covenants 134:1, while also adding the injunction that “all men” should involve themselves in
criminal law enforcement, id. at 134:8. Finally, the possibility that a passage of scripture (as
distinguished, for instance, from a legislative statute) might contain redundancies, even
deliberate ones, should not be surprising. Rather, such scriptural redundancies are frequent and
help lead to an interpretation in which all components are mutually reinforcing.
66. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 872–74.
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67

tenuous. In any event, the passage’s support for a retributive theory
is by no means obvious, as Gardner’s discussion itself
68
acknowledges.
Church President Brigham Young’s injunction to the church’s
Municipal High Council to bring church members in fraud and theft
69
cases to justice prior to the Nauvoo exodus out of a fear that they
70
would otherwise go unpunished is also by no means clearly
retributivist. Though the language of his statement is reminiscent of
Kant’s claim that a society could not properly disband without first
71
dispensing justice to all who deserved it, Brigham Young’s fear
instead could have arisen from a much more pragmatic worry about
72
“going into the wilderness alone” with groups of church members
who remained ill-disposed towards one another because of
73
unresolved legal disputes.
Similarly, Elder Dallin Oaks’ recent statement that “the
74
paramount concern of human law is justice” also does not
67. See generally LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON
EXPERIENCE 44–82 (1979) (describing the persecutions of early church members between
1832 and 1846 across Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois).
68. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 873–74. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that
ecclesiastical sanctions “might be as effective as civil punishment” for deterrent (or other
utilitarian) purposes, id. at 874, even at the time of section 42, when the insular church
community often relied heavily on ecclesiastical courts.
69. In response to growing persecution, early members of the church, in 1846, hastily
abandoned their thriving community on the banks of the Mississippi River at Nauvoo, Illinois,
then the second largest city in Illinois, to begin the final stage of their westward migration to
what would become the State of Deseret, precursor to the Utah Territory. See ARRINGTON &
BITTON, supra note 67, at 69, 94–101, 162–63.
70. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 874.
71. See id. at 863–64 & n.8 (quoting KANT, supra note 11, at 102).
72. Id. at 874 (relating Brigham Young’s injunction as quoted in EDWIN BROWN
FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS 361 (1988)). Here,
“alone” did not mean unaccompanied, as Brigham Young was planning the exodus of an entire
people, and instead may have been a euphemism for “without secular law or authority,” as the
church members anticipated leaving U.S. law behind.
73. As a possible response to this concern, Gardner suggests that the LDS community
could simply have left wrongdoers behind, after ecclesiastical court proceedings, without
needing to impose civil punishments upon them. See id. at 874–75. Yet given that during this
period church courts already routinely exercised ecclesiastical and civil authority, there is
nothing unusual—nor necessarily retributive—in Young’s injunction that the courts continue
to bring offenders to justice during the exodus.
74. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 876 (quoting DALLIN H. OAKS, THE LORD’S WAY
217 (1991)). Dallin H. Oaks, formerly on the faculty of the University of Chicago Law School
and president of Brigham Young University, now serves as a member of the church’s Quorum
of the Twelve Apostles.
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necessarily reflect a view that retribution should be the primary
justification for secular punishment. Rather, it may simply mean that
secular (“human”) law, to be valid in the eyes of the citizenry, must
be regular, impartial, fair, and predicate its punishments upon
75
principles of culpability and proportionality. In addition, Elder Neal
Maxwell’s very recent remark about the tendency of many people
today to confuse mercy and justice and “to shy away from correction
76
even when it might be helpful” immediately suggests something
quite different to me than approval of retributive theory, as Gardner
77
reads it. Rather, this statement seems explicitly to recognize the
rehabilitative value of punishment, and to encourage us to be much
more welcoming of secular sanctions precisely because they can help
78
us to learn our lessons.
Indeed, the idea of rehabilitation infuses remarks made by the
prophet Joseph Smith during his candidacy for President of the
79
United States in 1844. He suggested that legislatures should
“pardon every convict in their several penitentiaries, blessing them as
80
they go, and saying to them . . . , ‘Go thy way and sin no more.’”
He urged that criminals, for their punishment, should be put to
work on public projects
75. As noted above, that society places a high value on ensuring that the punishment fits
the crime—in other words, that the distribution of punishment be based upon some
“retributive” principle—does not necessarily mean that society’s primary justification for the
imposition of punishment is retributive. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. Nor is
a concern that punishments be proportional in order to be “just” necessarily retributive. See
supra note 62.
76. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 875 (quoting Maxwell, supra note 55, at 12). Like
Elder Oaks, Neal A. Maxwell, formerly on the faculty of the Political Science Department of
the University of Utah, also serves as a member of the church’s Quorum of the Twelve
Apostles.
77. See id. at 875–76 & n.42.
78. Gardner acknowledges this possible interpretation, but argues that punishment is
“helpful” only “in addition to its other virtues.” Id. at 876 n.42 (emphasis omitted).
79. As president of the church, Smith canvassed likely candidates for President of the
United States in the election of 1844 concerning their disposition towards the church. Not
fully satisfied by any of their answers, Smith undertook his own candidacy from January 1844
until his assassination in June 1844. In addition to calling for prison reform, his platform
advocated revoking imprisonment for debt, abolishing slavery by 1850, establishing a national
bank, and annexing Texas and Oregon. See CHURCH EDUC. SYS., CHURCH HISTORY IN THE
FULNESS OF TIMES 269–70 (1989).
80. 6 JOSEPH SMITH, JR., HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 205 (B.H. Roberts ed., 1950).
These remarks are obviously reminiscent of Christ’s response to the woman taken in adultery,
for whom the prescribed punishment under the Mosaic Law would have been stoning. See John
8:1–11.
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or any place where the culprit can be taught more wisdom and
more virtue, and become more enlightened. Rigor and seclusion
will never do as much to reform the propensities of men as reason
and friendship . . . . Let the penitentiaries be turned into seminaries
of learning, where intelligence . . . would banish such fragments of
barbarism.”81

These remarks, with their explicit emphasis on forgiveness and
reform, rather than “desert,” seem fundamentally inconsistent with
the idea that secular retribution is necessary in order for justice to be
done.
CONCLUSION
I have confessed some sympathy for the idea that wrongdoing
merits a sanction without regard to the resulting benefits to society.
But I trace this feeling to an underlying belief that punishment may
ultimately benefit the wrongdoer, and I fear that secular institutions
are ill-equipped to dispense punishments on this basis alone.
Furthermore, I see no necessity for them to do so. Instead,
implications of the atonement, along with other aspects of LDS
theology, reinforce in me a sense that from a theological standpoint,
secular punishments are justified primarily by the way in which they
help individuals to avoid or learn from error, and secondarily by the
way that they help provide a stable society in which we all may more
meaningfully exercise our agency. Regardless of whatever cosmic or
eternal balancing ultimately may be required for our wrongdoing,
the atonement will cover all but the smallest token contribution that
we as individuals can make. Although we, in turn, may be expected
to make these token contributions wherever we have the opportunity
(including wherever our secular society requires them of us), we do
so not in order to effectuate the retributive balancing of accounts.
Rather, we do so both to help us “learn our lesson” and as an
expression of the faith and gratitude necessary to effectuate the full
gift of the atonement.

81. SMITH, supra note 80, at 205.
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